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INTRODUCTION
Between the spring of 2000 and the spring of 2001, the electricity in-
dustry in California suffered through one of the worst regulatory crises in
modem American history. In a few months, five years of painstaking and
revolutionary reform were wiped out, and two of the three large private
utilities in the state were forced into insolvency. At the end of this period
of crisis, California was left with an electric power sector that was largely
dominated by the state government, and faced electricity rates far above
national averages (and above pre-reform rates), rather than the decentral-
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ized, market-dominated industry and low, cost-based rates that had been
the objective of the reform efforts begun in 1994.
The details of precisely what went wrong in California have already
been discussed extensively by a range of actors, from politicians crying
"Enron!",' to a careful and detailed scholarly evaluation of the progression
of the crisis by the economist Paul Joskow. 2 This Article seeks to supple-
ment these efforts by focusing not on the details of the meltdown that oc-
curred from 2000 to 2001, but rather on more fundamental concerns about
the reform model adopted by California, which were exposed by the crisis.
The thought behind the Article is that such a focus will provide lessons for
future reform efforts in California and elsewhere. In particular, this Article
draws upon the teachings of the New Institutional Economics 3 to gain a
better understanding of the basic institutional and structural problems with
the energy markets put into place in California as a result of the 1994 re-
forms.
The Article begins by briefly describing the traditional structure of the
electricity industry in California (and elsewhere in this country), as well as
the reforms implemented by California during the mid-1990s. The Article
then proceeds to recount the events that occurred during the electricity cri-
sis which exploded in the spring of 2000, and during its aftermath through
the summer of 2001. Finally, the Article turns to the institutional lessons
that can be learned by studying the details of the crisis, analyzing which
basic institutional structures failed during the crisis period, and relating
these failures to the teachings of the New Institutional Economics.
1. See Joseph Kahn, Californians Call Enron Documents the Smoking Gun, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2002, at Al (discussing investigations into energy trading companies for ma-
nipulative trading strategies).
2. See Paul L. Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis (Working Paper Nov. 28, 2001)
(forthcoming Oxford Review of Economic Policy) (discussing California's electricity crisis
in three phrases from 2000 to 2001), available at http:/econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/pjosk
ow/files/CALIFORNIA 11-28-01.pdf; see also Michael A. Yuffee, California's Electricity
Crisis: How Best to Respond to the "Perfect Storm ", 22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 74-84 (2001) (ad-
dressing proposed remedies to California's energy crisis at both state and federal levels). I
rely heavily on Professor Joskow's description and analysis of the California crisis in the
early portions of this paper and am indebted to him for his careful and thorough work.
3. The "New Institutional Economics" is a school of thought that has its roots in the
ideas of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase of the University of Chicago and has been further
developed by Oliver Williamson and others at the University of California at Berkeley. See
infra notes 44-49 & accompanying text.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
4
The electricity industry is composed of three basic physical components
and associated functionalities, each of which must continuously coordinate
and interact with the others in order to permit the provision of electricity to
retail customers. First, there is generation: the actual creation of electric-
ity. Electricity is generated in a variety of different kinds of plants, in-
cluding fossil fuel (i.e., coal, oil, and natural gas) fired plants, nuclear
plants, and hydroelectric plants. Generation plants can be very large and
capital intensive (such as nuclear plants), in which case they tend to have
low marginal costs of operation, or they can be relatively small and inex-
pensive (such as "peaking" natural gas fired plants), in which case they
tend to have high costs of operation. Most generation plants, especially the
large, capital intensive ones, which provide the "base load" of electricity,
tend to be located in rural areas some distance from the centers of con-
sumption for some combination of economic, environmental, safety, and
(in the case of hydroelectric power) geographic reasons.
Because most electricity is generated some distance from where it is
consumed, the electricity must be moved from the generating plants to
where most customers exist. This process constitutes the second compo-
nent of the industry-transmission. Transmission of electricity over long
distances occurs through the use of high-voltage electric lines, which can
be seen criss-crossing the countryside. There are inherent limits to how far
electricity may be transmitted economically because of inevitable physical
losses that occur during transmission. During recent decades, however,
there have been very significant technological improvements in our ability
to transmit electricity over very long distances without suffering uneco-
nomical losses.
Once electricity has been transmitted to the vicinity where it will be con-
sumed, the electricity must be distributed to end-use customers. This proc-
ess involves several steps. First, voltage levels typically (except for large,
industrial customers) must be reduced to the level at which the electricity
will be consumed (110 volts in the United States). Then, the electricity
must be distributed over a local network of low-voltage electric lines to the
actual homes and commercial establishments where the electricity will be
used. These functions, along with the associated ministerial functions of
metering the amount of electricity used by each customers, billing for use,
4. See Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 829-37 (1998) (providing a more detailed but nonetheless
succinct history of the industry); Timothy P. Duane, Regulations Rationale: Learning from
the California Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 476-87 (2002).
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and maintaining and repairing lines, constitute the third component of the
electricity industry-local distribution.
This basic industry structure (consisting of production, wholesale trans-
portation, and retail distribution) does not seem terribly different from other
products. Electricity, however, is fundamentally different from other prod-
ucts in a number of ways. Most importantly, electricity cannot be stored in
significant quantities. This is the one basic and overwhelmingly important
physical fact about electricity that defines the structure of the electricity in-
dustry and distinguishes it from most other sectors of the economy. The
inability to store electricity means that it must be generated at the same
time that it is consumed; this in turn requires every electricity system to
have a central controller who ensures that as levels of consumption increase
or decrease, the amount of electricity being pumped into the system is ad-
justed to conform to demand. In addition to the problem of storage, an-
other distinctive feature of electricity is that the transmission of electricity
is a highly complex, interdependent phenomenon which obeys physical
laws having little or no connection to economic relationships. 5 In particu-
lar, the interconnected nature of electric grids (itself an important con-
tributor to safety and reliability) results in very significant network interac-
tions between different users of grids, and therefore once again necessitates
a central coordinator to ensure that grid interactions are minimized or coor-
dinated in such a way as to maximize economic efficiency (by minimizing
the combined costs of generation and transmission).
Very early on in the history of the electricity industry, competition ex-
isted in every sector of the electricity industry. For most of the Twentieth
Century, however, it was assumed (probably correctly) that because of
economies of scale in the generation of electricity combined with limits on
the ability to transmit power significant distances, all three components of
the industry were naturally monopolistic. As a result, the electricity indus-
try as it has developed in this country is dominated by fully integrated, pri-
vately owned (but publicly regulated) 6 utilities controlling all three func-
tions and serving local areas on a monopoly basis. This vertically
integrated structure permitted the industry to minimize the potential prob-
5. For a more comprehensive discussion of network interactions, see William W. Ho-
gan, Electric Transmission: A New Model for Old Principles, 6 ELEC. J. 18 (1993).
6. Regulatory power over private utilities has been exercised primarily by state gov-
ernments through Public Utilities Commissions or similar regulatory bodies. The federal
government, first through the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and then through the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), exercises jurisdiction over wholesales of
electricity between utilities (or between independent power generators and utilities). During
much of the relevant period of time, such wholesales were a very small portion of the mar-
ket. As discussed below, however, in recent years a thriving wholesale electricity market
has emerged, increasing the importance of federal regulatory authority.
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lems inhering in the coordination needs discussed above, because each of
the functions requiring coordination was performed internally by utilities
which themselves owned and controlled all of the affected components of
the system. Because of the ability of integrated utilities to provide these
coordination functions, and because of rapid technological advances lead-
ing to steadily declining real prices, until the 1970s, the existing structure
of the electricity industry was considered highly successful (though it is
likely that even during this period, technological improvements were
masking underlying structural inefficiencies).
In the 1970s, however, complacency with the existing electricity indus-
try's structure and performance began to evaporate. In particular, the En-
ergy Crisis triggered by the formation of OPEC and the 1973 Arab Oil Em-
bargo led to sharply increasing electricity prices beginning in the mid-
1970s. In addition, during the 1970s, electricity utilities in this country en-
gaged in a massive program of building large generation plants (many of
them nuclear) in order to meet anticipated demand. By the end of the dec-
ade, however, rising energy prices and related conservation efforts had led
to substantial declines in predicted demand. As a consequence, when the
power plants begun in the 1970s were finally completed (often hugely over
budget due to changes in safety regulations for nuclear plants stemming
from the Three Mile Island incident), their capacity was not needed. The
result was a regulatory battle royale during the 1980s, which produced
sharply increasing rates as the costs of these plants were incorporated into
the utilities' ratebases, massive regulatory disallowances in some instances
of the costs of building the new plants, and consequent financial woes (in-
cluding some bankruptcies) for electric utilities.
7
In addition to this regulatory crisis, other events were also setting the
stage for the regulatory reforms of the past decade. First of all, there were
significant technological developments during this period, the result of
which was to make long distance transmission of electricity far more effi-
cient than was previously the case, and to reduce the size of efficient gen-
erating plants significantly (i.e., by the 1990s, electricity could be gener-
ated at low cost at plants which were much smaller, and less expensive,
than similarly efficient plants in the 1960s). As a result, by the 1990s, there
was reason to think that because of improved transmission (increasing the
size of geographic markets) and declining economies of scale, at least the
7. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:
Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 502-05 (1984) (describing
and analyzing the events in more detail); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility
Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political institutions?, 77
GEO. L.J. 2031, 2047-53 (1989) (discussing possible judicial responses to regulatory disal-
lowances).
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generation of electricity no longer displayed natural monopoly characteris-
tics, and so there was at least the potential for competition among electric-
ity generators.
Accompanying these technological changes were regulatory changes and
legislation, which made the possibility of competition in the electricity in-
dustry seem more likely. In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),s which effectively required regulated
electric utilities to purchase power under long term contracts from qualify-
ing (QF) cogeneration and environmentally friendly independent power
generators. During the 1980s, the combination of PURPA and other tech-
nological, regulatory, and economic changes led to the creation of a grow-
ing wholesale market for electric power, in which utilities were increas-
ingly willing to, or required to, purchase their power needs from others
rather than simply self-supplying by building generation facilities. In the
1990s, this trend has continued to expand, aided by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) Order 888 issued in 1996, which re-
quired "wholesale wheeling"--i.e., that electricity utilities must provide
equal access to their high-voltage transmission facilities for others who
wished to use the transmission lines to transact wholesales of electricity,
where the buyer and seller are separated by the high-voltage lines of third-
party utilities.9
The status of the electricity industry in California provides the final,
necessary background to understanding the reform efforts of the 1990s.
Until the mid-1990s, California's electricity industry had a classic, verti-
cally integrated structure, dominated by three investor owned utilities
(IOUs): Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE),
and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), each of which served a distinct
geographic region.' 0 However, California suffered from the problems de-
scribed above, and to a greater degree than most of the country. In par-
ticular, California IOUs had made very expensive investments in nuclear
capacity, and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) had ag-
gressively implemented PURPA, resulting in very high-cost, long term
8. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (2001).
9. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, 75 FERC, 61,080, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 31,036, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 85 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37, 385). For a description of
Order 888 and a decision upholding one aspect of it, see New York v. FERC, 122 S. Ct.
1012 (2002) (finding that FERC properly extended wheeling obligations to unbundled retail
electricity transmissions).
10. It should be noted, however, that California was unusual in that publicly-owned
municipal utilities also played an important role in the market, in particular serving the larg-
est city in the state, Los Angeles.
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contractual commitments imposed on the IOUs to buy "co-generated"
electricity. The result of all of this, combined with a sharp recession in the
early 1990s, was that California had massive overcapacity in electricity as
of 1993, which was expected to last for at least ten years, as well as some
of the highest electricity prices in the country.
II. CALIFORNIA'S REGULATORY REFORMS
In 1994, the CPUC initiated regulatory proceedings designed to radically
reorganize California's electricity industry." The gist of the CPUC's pro-
posals was a complete separation of the potentially competitive generation
sector from the still monopolistic transmission and distribution sectors,
thereby permitting competition in generation to flourish while maintaining
needed, centralized control over the high-voltage transmission network and
local distribution monopolies-a scheme which was clearly the most radi-
cal electricity reform attempted to date in this country. After two years of
negotiations and revisions, in late 1995 to early 1996, the CPUC announced
its decision on electricity reform; 12 and later, in 1996, the California legis-
lature passed legislation essentially codifying the CPUC's plan. 3 As fi-
nally adopted, the legislation: (1) created a nonprofit Independent System
Operator (ISO) to control the high-voltage transmission networks previ-
ously owned and controlled by the IOUs; (2) created a nonprofit Power Ex-
change (PX), an electricity market into which the IOUs were required to
sell the power they generated, and from which they were required to pur-
chase all of their power needs; (3) encouraged the IOUs to sell most of
their generating assets and encouraged other power generators to enter the
California market; and (4) created a complex series of mechanisms which
provided IOUs with the opportunity to recover their "stranded costs" dur-
ing the transition to full competition. The following are the major elements
of California's reforms: 14
1. Creating a nonprofit Independent System Operator (ISO). Transfer-
ring control (though not ownership) of transmission networks owned by the
three IOUs to the ISO which would: (a) operate the system on a nondis-
criminatory equal access basis, permitting all generators and purchasers of
electricity to access and use the network on equal terms; (b) schedule elec-
tricity sales arranged by others (as discussed below); and (c) organize pay-
11. See Joskow, supra note 2, at 9.
12. Decision 95-12-063 (CPUC Dec. 20, 1995) as modified by Decision 96-01-009
(CPUC Jan. 10, 1996).
13. See Electrical Restructuring, A.B. 1890, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854 (codified at CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODe §§ 330-399 (West Supp. 2002)).
14. See Joskow, supra note 2, at 7-13 (providing more detailed description of Califor-
nia's reforms).
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ments for power sales made through its markets. The ISO would also be
responsible for managing congestion on the network, charging extra for
transmission during congestion periods, balancing supply and demand on a
real-time basis by operating a real-time spot market to make sure loads re-
mained balanced, and operating a market for "ancillary" services, which
most importantly would ensure that reserves remained available in case of
unexpected outages or other events.
2. Creating a nonprofit Power Exchange (PX), which would operate
hourly day-ahead and hour-ahead forward markets for electricity. Prices on
the PX were to be determined by receiving demand and supply bids for
each hour of the day, stacking up the bids on each side, and clearing the
market at the point where the total supply bids equaled the predicted de-
mand. All suppliers would then receive the market clearing price, which is
the price bid by the last supplier (i.e., the highest bid price) necessary to
satisfy demand. The theory behind this pricing scheme was to establish
prices at the true, marginal cost of electricity, an approach well-supported
by theory so long as the exchange market remained competitive and there-
fore supplier bids did in fact reflect marginal costs of production. The ISO
would then arrange to schedule all electricity sales made through the PX
forward market, as well as any sales arranged through independent bilateral
contracts (which were permitted for all parties except IOUs, for reasons
discussed below).' 5 The purpose of the PX market was to provide more
predictability and planning then a pure real-time spot market would-but
because the PX was limited to day-ahead sales, obviously it provided no
long term planning capacity.16
3. Mandating that all retail customers be provided "direct access" to
competitive wholesale power markets, by requiring the IOUs to provide
equal access to their (still monopolistic) retail local distribution networks
as well as to the wholesale transmission systems operated by the ISO, so
that retail customers could purchase electricity supplies directly from com-
petitive generators or market intermediaries (jointly called competitive
Electric Service Providers or ESPs). However, IOUs remained responsible
15. It is important to understand that the transactions made through the PX did not nec-
essarily result in actual provision of power through the ISO--such actual planning is physi-
cally impossible because of the system interaction and congestion issues discussed above,
which might require a central system operator (the ISO in the case of California) to rear-
range supplies. So in effect, a PX transaction is a financial guarantee by the seller that if the
buyer ends up having to pay more for electricity, the seller will cover the difference (and in
reverse, if the real-time price is lower than the PX price, the PX seller pockets the differ-
ence).
16. In mid-2000, just as the power crisis was beginning, the PX did begin to permit
some longer term forward contracts (through the end of 2001), but they turned out to be
quite limited in scope.
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to provide "default" service for all customers who chose not to migrate to
ESPs. For nonresidential customers, the price for this default service was
based on the wholesale spot prices for electricity on the PX. For residential
and small commercial customers, the price of default service would also
eventually be based on spot prices; but for the first four years of the re-
forms, prices for default service were frozen at levels ten percent below
pre-reform prices (as discussed in more detail below).
4. Strongly encouraging the three IOUs to divest their remaining elec-
tricity generating capacity to independent entities in order to try and create
a viably competitive market for generation. Eventually, the IOUs did in
fact divest essentially all of their fossil fuel fired generators (i.e., every-
thing except for their nuclear and hydroelectric facilities). In addition, the
IOUs were required to bid the output from all of their remaining generating
capacity into the PX's day-ahead market in order to provide the market
with liquidity. Finally, and most importantly, the IOUs were required to
purchase all of their power needs for retained, default customers through
the PX. In effect, the IOUs bid their power into the PX, and purchased
power out of it. Their purchases, however, were always greater than their
sales, because they had divested their fossil-fuel plants but (as discussed
further below) ended up retaining almost all of their pre-reform customers.
5. Creating a complicated set of mechanisms that would provide IOUs
with at least the opportunity to recover 100 percent of their "stranded
costs," which primarily consisted of the difference between the market
price of divested generating assets and their "book value" according to tra-
ditional regulatory methods. Most importantly, the CPUC and legislative
proposals created a "rate freeze" for all residential and small commercial
customers, at a level ten percent below prevailing rates, with the idea that
the new retail rates would remain above wholesale prices, so the IOUs
could use the differential to recover their stranded costs. This gap or
"headroom" was uncircumventable, and was billed as a "competitive tran-
sition charge" to all customers, regardless of whether they migrated to
ESPs.
6. Finally, entry into the generation market was "deregulated" by per-
mitting any new generation facility that met ISO rules to hook into its
transmission system. However, the reforms adopted by the legislature and
CPUC did not alter in any way the zoning, siting, and environmental rules
governing building a new power plant, thus making the "deregulation" of
entry somewhat fictitious.
In short, the regulatory reform model adopted by the CPUC and the
California legislature constituted a move from a completely integrated, tra-
ditional utility model to a radically decentralized market model, with all of
its strengths and weaknesses.
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Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the pre-reform industry, while Figure
2 illustrates the post-reform structure of electricity markets in California.
Figure 1: Pre-Reform California Electricity Industry
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Obviously, the Califomia reform program was extraordinarily compli-
cated, with essentially every sector of the industry being radically over-
hauled. In fact, for the first two years of its operation, from April 1998
(when the reform proposals first went into effect) to April 2000, the new
system seemed to be working fairly well. Wholesale prices fell, retail
competition was beginning to take hold (albeit very slowly), and new entry
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into generation seemed to be developing. There were, of course, some
problems: for example, the ISO's congestion management systems required
constant tweaking, ancillary and reserve service markets were not func-
tioning entirely properly, wholesale prices did not fall as much as expected,
and at very high-demand times there were signs that markets were not op-
erating competitively.' 7 But on the whole, things went reasonably well un-
til May of 2000.
Not only did California's reformed markets seem to be operating fairly
successfully, but it is also important to recognize (without the benefit of
hindsight) that there were likely to be important positive results from the
kind of market-oriented reforms adopted in California. Most significantly,
generating costs and prices in such a system were likely to end up signifi-
cantly lower than in a traditional, regulated and integrated system, as cost-
cutting was rewarded by the market and prices tended to be bid down to-
wards the marginal cost of generation. In addition, the replacement of
regulatory oversight by market forces would tend to eliminate the sorts of
political gaming, which were the bane of California's pre-reform experi-
ences. In particular, in a market driven system regulatory interference (ei-
ther ex ante or ex post, through regulatory disallowances) in investment de-
cisions regarding building generation capacity would be reduced as those
decisions became driven by market, not political, motives, leading to
quicker entry and more efficient decision making. Additionally, in princi-
ple the IOUs themselves should have been more financially stable in a
market system because their rate of return would no longer be subject to the
whims of regulators disallowing the costs of constructing generating ca-
pacity (as happened to many utilities in the 1980s), but rather would be
based on fairly stable income from transmission and distribution services.
Finally, insofar as retail prices were permitted to reflect market prices (a
big "insofar" in the California system, admittedly), demand was likely to be
more elastic and responsive to changing costs, thereby limiting the social
waste of excessive consumption during peak demand and supply shortage
periods (and conversely, too little demand during non-peak and surplus
supply times). In other words, the benefits of the reforms were expected to
be the usual combination of higher efficiency, more responsiveness, and
lower prices associated with markets. Because California's system seemed
to maximize those benefits, it received a fair bit of praise from across the
field during its planning stages.
However, there were also problems brewing during this period. In par-
ticular, the retail rate freeze combined with customer loyalty or "stickiness"
made it very hard for ESPs to compete with the IOUs' default service for
17. Joskow, supra note 2, at 21-23.
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customers, so that at its peak only three percent of customers, representing
twelve percent of electricity consumption, migrated from IOUs to ESPs.18
This resulted in two very bad things. First, it meant much more reliance on
IOU spot market purchases than was planned, because IOU default obliga-
tions were much higher than expected. On the flip side, real ESP entry
would have lead to more long term planning because ESPs necessarily
would have ensured they had either actual generation or contractual com-
mitments to meet their obligations (something the IOUs were forbidden
from doing because of their obligation to purchase on the PX). One further
complication here is that under the California scheme, consumers were al-
ways permitted to return to "default" service from the IOUs. This had the
perverse effect of discouraging commitment by ESPs, who knew that they
could always return their customers to IOUs at will; and during the crisis
that is precisely what the ESPs did, since they found it more profitable to
sell their power into the PX at sky-high prices than to sell it directly to their
own customers at previously agreed upon rates. But of course this behavior
further increased IOU obligations, and so their reliance on the PX spot
market.
The practical impact of the very high level of IOU default service, com-
bined with the IOUs' obligation to rely on spot markets to purchase their
default energy obligations, was that IOUs were highly vulnerable to spot
market volatility-and price volatility is of course a common characteristic
of spot markets. Combined with the retail rate freeze, this also meant that
the IOUs were subject to enormous potential liabilities if wholesale prices
rose (as they did), a possibility that no one seems to have contemplated at
the time the reforms were designed.
A question one might ask at this point is: why did the IOUs agreed to the
ten percent rate reduction and four-year rate freeze? The freeze was, after
all, what ultimately led them to bankruptcy, and it seems completely incon-
sistent with the idea of competitive markets that transmit price signals. The
answer is complicated. At first, the IOUs were in fact opposed to the
CPUC's reform proposals. Once the inevitability of reform became clear,
however, the IOUs' priority in negotiating over the CPUC proposals be-
came to ensure that any reforms adopted did not wipe out their existing
"stranded" book costs of assets (these costs were considered "stranded" on
the theory that the assets would be worth less than their depreciated book
value in a deregulated environment). Given this, the rate freeze seems to
have been the quid pro quo the IOUs provided for the opportunity to re-
cover 100% of their stranded costs. The idea was that lower wholesale
prices would more than compensate the IOUs for the rate reduction, and
18. Id. at 28.
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that permitting the IOUs to continue charging old rates was to their benefit
because it would provide excess revenues-though, of course, this scheme
provided no guarantee of stranded cost recovery, since the size of the gap
between wholesale and retail prices was not assured. However, the IOUs
simply do not seem to have considered, or did not take seriously, the possi-
bility of high wholesale prices and the resulting potential price squeezes
they would face. In other words, the (what was in retrospect) shortsighted-
ness and riskiness of the reforms as designed were not simply a product of
legislative and regulatory error. The California IOUs signed up to the
CPUC reform plan because they got something very valuable out of it, and
in doing so, ignored some very serious risks.' 9
III. THE ELECTRICITY CRISIS STAGE 1: MARKET FAILURE TO INSOLVENCY
By May of 2000, the stage was set for the serious shortcomings of Cali-
fornia's reform efforts to emerge. The actual events that transpired, how-
ever, were a far greater disaster than anyone could have expected. This oc-
curred because in the summer of 2000 a largely unpredictable (and
certainly unpredicted) concatenation of events came together to create what
Michael Yuffee describes as a "perfect storm": 20 a worst-possible-
circumstances scenario in which all of the inherent flaws in the California
design combined with sheer bad luck to create catastrophe. In fact, several
exogenous trends came to a head together during 2000 in a way which
would have created severe difficulties no matter what the structure of the
California electricity industry. It was just California's bad luck that these
events happened to interact with the most precarious features of the Cali-
fornia reforms.
The first and undoubtedly most important exogenous event occurred on
the demand side of the market.21 Throughout the late 1990s, demand for
electricity in California grew far faster than expected, rising over ten per-
cent from mid-1999 to mid-2000 alone.22 The exact reasons for this explo-
sion in demand are not certain, but the economic and Internet
boom/bubbles of the late Clinton Administration surely played a role.
Generation capacity in California did not grow to keep up with this de-
mand, and indeed, did not grow at all during most of this period. Part of
the reason for the failure to add capacity was simply that (as noted above)
by the early 1990s California had substantial excess capacity which was
19. See Duane, supra note 4, at 501-03 & n.108 (noting utilities supported rate freeze
because they saw it as advantageous to them).
20. See Yuffee, supra note 2, at 65.
21. In describing these events, I borrow heavily from Paul Joskow's work. See supra
note 2.
22. Jaskow, supra note 2, at 62 tbl.3.
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expected to last ten years, and so there was no perceived need to build
power plants. As demand grew faster than projected, however, the failure
to keep up could not be so easily excused and must be attributed to some
combination of poor planning (indeed, a complete failure of planning, as
will be discussed later), delays in regulatory approval processes, the un-
certainty engendered by the regulatory reforms themselves, and the sheer
time span necessary to construct a major generation facility.
Second, just as demand was growing and capacity remained stagnant, in
2000-2001 imports of power into California from other western states were
severely restricted, falling by overfifty percent from the summer of 1999 to
2000.23 These shortfalls occurred because the other western states also
faced very high and increasing demand during this period, and also (more
significantly) because the Northwest suffered a serious drought during this
time, leading to a big shortfall in hydroelectric supplies.
A third, unrelated but very significant set of events affecting electricity
prices in California involved the price of natural gas-fired electricity. In
the year 2000, especially at the end of that year and the beginning of 2001,
natural gas prices rose sharply throughout the United States, and spiked
dramatically higher than even the national averages in Southern California.
At the same time, the cost of environmental permits necessary to operate
natural gas-fired plants (NOx emissions permits, to be precise) rose by a
factor of ten, once again causing massive increases in costs for gas-fired
generators. 24 Because natural gas-fired generation provides essentially all
marginal capacity in California, these cost increases translated directly into
the marginal cost of electricity, and thus into the market clearing price in
the PX market during the crisis period.
Finally, from late 2000 through the spring of 2001, there were enor-
mously large outages of generator supplies at levels many times the historic
norm. As a result, supplies were heavily squeezed. Again, the precise rea-
sons for these outages are not entirely clear and indeed hotly contested (the
generators claim they were a result of running their equipment excessively
during the summer of 2000). Evidence, however, suggests that these out-
ages were at least in part attributable to generators intentionally withhold-
ing supplies because they knew that in a very tight market, such withhold-
ing would cause spikes in spot market prices and thus would be profitable
to all.25
23. Id. at 63 tbl.4.
24. Id, at 32-34.
25. See Paul L. Joskow & Edward Kahn, A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior
in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000: The Final Word
(Working Paper Feb. 4, 2002) (analyzing empirical evidence and concluding that exercises
of market power, including unilateral capacity withholding, contributed significantly to the
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The result of these events, combined with the structure of the California
markets (especially the PX's bidding and pricing system), was an explosion
of wholesale electricity prices (both on the PX and in the ISO's real-time
balancing market), from a typical pre-crisis level of $30/MwH to levels as
high as $400/MwH in December of 2000 as well as a series of rolling
blackouts.26 Moreover, throughout this period the three IOUs remained
obliged to purchase essentially all of their electricity requirements on the
PX, and to resell that electricity to default customers at frozen retail rates
equivalent to about $65/MWh.2 In addition, during this period the IOUs
continued to face residual demand at levels far greater than expected be-
cause so few customers had migrated to ESPs (and indeed, most of the few
that had were returned to IOU default service by the ESPs during the crisis,
so that the ESPs could sell their electricity at PX prices).28 As the level of
their default obligations, and thus their exposure to the PX spot market be-
came clear, the IOUs might have been able to protect themselves somewhat
from these events by entering into long term contracts with generators to
purchase electricity, to hedge their exposure to volatile spot prices on the
PX. And indeed, beginning in 1999, the IOUs asked the CPUC for permis-
sion to enter into such contracts. However, the CPUC at first completely
refused such permission, presumably because of the Commission's desire
to retain liquidity in the PX market which depended so heavily on IOU
purchases, as well as an ideological commitment to "markets" and marginal
cost pricing.29 The CPUC eventually granted permission for long-term
contracts, but on such a limited basis that the IOUs remained essentially
unhedged.
high prices during the California crisis), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/pjo
skow/papers.htm; see also John C. Hilke & Michael Wise, Competition and California's
Power Crisis, 15 ANTITRUST No. 3, 76, 79-81 (2001) (discussing and evaluating the evi-
dence of anticompetitive activity by generators during the crisis period); Duane, supra note
4, at 512-14.
26. Joskow, supra note 2, at 18 tbl.2.
27. To be absolutely precise, one of the IOUs, SDG&E, had actually been released
from the retail price freeze at the beginning of 2000, and thus was charging customers retail
prices based on wholesale PX rates in the summer of 2000. However, once wholesale prices
began to explode, the legislature rolled back and froze SDG&E's rates to the same level as
the other IOUs.
28. The author was one of those customers who was unceremoniously dumped by an
ESP, and can testify that it was not a mutually agreed upon transaction.
29. See Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federal-
ism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH.
L. REv. 1768, 1779 (2002) (discussing reasons for and effects of CPUC's ban on long-term
contracting by IOUs); Duane, supra note 4, at 498-99. Of course, subsequent events re-
vealed the shortsightedness of this philosophy and perhaps of those ideological commit-
ments.
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The result of all of this was a price squeeze imposed on the IOUs (the
product of buying electricity at hundreds of dollars per MWh and selling at
$65), which by the end of the year made the two largest IOUs, PG&E and
SCE, insolvent and unable to purchase further electric supplies or even pay
for supplies already delivered.30 Meanwhile, the state government did es-
sentially nothing throughout the end of 2000 despite repeated pleas from
the IOUs to release them from the retail rate freeze, and FERC imposed
entirely ineffectual market mitigation mechanisms which failed to address
any of the underlying problems (though to be fair, it is not entirely clear
that FERC could have prevented the meltdown given the existence of real
cost increases and shortages as well as frozen retail rates).3
IV. CRISIS STAGE 2 AND THE AFTERMATH: CREEPING SOCIALISM
As a result of these events, by January 2001, the lights were on the verge
of going out in California since generators were no longer willing to do
business with the primary procurers of power, the IOUs, because of their
lack of creditworthiness. At this point, the government of the state of Cali-
fornia-in particular, the California Department of Water Resources
(CDWR)-stepped in and began purchasing electricity to ensure that the
IOUs could supply their customers. These purchases were made at first on
the spot markets, but by the spring, as spot market prices remained at ex-
traordinarily high levels and the peak-demand summer season approached,
the CDWR began negotiating long term contracts of up to twenty years to
provide some protection against the even higher summer spot prices (and
massive blackouts) that were predicted. Thus by the spring of 2001, the
electricity industry in California had been converted from one of the least
centralized electricity markets in the world into an essentially state-run
sector, with the IOUs relegated to the minimal tasks of distribution and
billing. Nonetheless, the State's taking over of the industry was largely un-
challenged, as it at least provided some stability to the industry and averted
further blackouts.
As it turned out, however, the spring of 2001 was the worst possible
time to enter into long term contracts to purchase electricity. When the
state entered into these contracts, spot and futures prices for electricity
were at some of the highest levels ever and the contract prices of course re-
30. PG&E eventually declared bankruptcy, as did the PX (which had been deprived of
its primary customers). SCE did not declare bankruptcy, and as of this writing appears to be
on the path to financial recovery. But see S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794 (9th
Cir. 2002) (raising doubts about the legality of the settlement between SCE and CPUC
which permits SCE to repay its creditors).
31. See Joskow, supra note 2, at 377; Yuffee, supra note 2, at 75-78, 81-83 (describing
regulatory responses during this period).
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flected this. Soon after these contracts were signed, in the early summer of
2001, spot prices began to drop rapidly, and eventually reached pre-crisis
levels, where they remain as of this writing. The reasons for this reversal
were the inverse of the original reasons for the price increases: substantial
reductions in demand due to very aggressive conservation efforts (and
probably the "Dot-gone" bust), increases in supply because outages had
been reduced, and big drops in natural gas prices.32 The state of California,
however, remained locked into very high-priced long term contracts to pur-
chase electricity and thus is likely to remain the primarily supplier of elec-
tricity to consumers for many years. Also, there is essentially no function-
ing spot market in electricity left in California.33 Furthermore, in June
2001, a forty percent price hike on retail rates (as approved by the legisla-
ture) was implemented to cover the state's high procurement costs, thereby
raising retail electricity rates to levels far above current wholesale market
prices. Finally, in September 2001, the CPUC announced the end of all Di-
rect Access to competitive electricity sources for retail customers (though
existing Direct Access contracts continue in force). This change in policy
was necessary because once the State had committed itself to above-market
price purchases by contract, large customers had a huge incentive to avoid
those higher prices by turning to ESPs (which could price based on current,
much lower market prices). As a result, if Direct Access were permitted,
the largest, most lucrative customers would flee (as they did in droves dur-
ing the summer of 2001), leaving smaller customers to bear the entire bur-
den of the State's contracts.
Thus, what the state of California was left with in the fall of 2001 (when
other, far more terrible events shifted public attention dramatically away
from the electricity crisis) was a state-controlled power sector where the
two largest IOUs were still struggling to regain solvency and the govern-
ment was likely to remain the primary supplier of power. Furthermore, be-
cause of the nature of the long term contracts entered into in the spring of
2001 by the CDWR, California seems to be bound for ten to twenty years
to electricity prices at three times current market levels. In response to that
situation, the state of California filed a complaint with FERC seeking to re-
vise or rescind its long term contracts on the grounds that the contractual
prices agreed to by California were the product of market manipulation be-
cause they reflected the artificially high spot prices during the spring of
32. Interestingly, imports of power into California did not increase from 2000 to 2001
and indeed decreased further. However, the other factors listed in the text more than made
up for the loss of imports.
33. In addition to the PX's bankruptcy, the real-time ISO balancing market has also
basically collapsed because no one will do business with the IOUs.
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2001, and therefore were not "just and reasonable". The likelihood of
success on this complaint, however, remains at best uncertain. In the
meantime, presumably the state government at some point will wish to
phase out its dominant role in the power sector and restore some sorts of
private institutions (whether market-based or not remains to be seen). But
given the collapse of the PX and the insolvency of the major IOUs, as well
as ongoing litigation over the reorganization of PG&E, it is hard to say ex-
actly how the state will proceed and what the ultimate structure of the Cali-
fornia electricity industry will look like.
V. INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA CRISIS
It is time to consider what "lessons" might be gleaned from the Califor-
nia Electricity Crisis-lessons which might benefit future planning for
regulatory reform in California and elsewhere. Any discussion of "les-
sons", however, must be built on an understanding of what precisely went
wrong in California. The answer to that latter question turns out to be quite
complex, not least because, in fact, there were two distinct phenomena at
work in California during the crisis months. Indeed, in a very real sense,
California suffered through two distinct energy crises. First, there was the
financial meltdown that led to the insolvency of the two largest IOUs
(PG&E and SCE) as well as the PX. Second, there were the severe power
shortages during 2000-2001 that led to spiking wholesale prices, and ulti-
mately blackouts.
Much of the focus of discussion in both the press and the literature has
been on the financial crisis and its consequences. In fact, the financial cri-
sis is in some ways the least interesting aspect of the California experience
because the reason for it is quite clear: it was the retail rate freeze. 35 The
California reform program required the IOUs to purchase power at spot-
market, wholesale prices (an approach perfectly consistent with the market-
oriented structure chosen by the CPUC and legislature), but then forced
them to resell to consumers at fixed, regulated retail prices (a provision en-
tirely inconsistent with reliance on market forces). The inevitable result
was that when wholesale prices rose, the utilities suffered an unsustainable
price squeeze. The ultimate cause of the financial meltdown of Califor-
nia's IOUs and PX was thus the original decision to combine floating
wholesale and fixed retail rates for IOU default service-a decision for
which blame can be freely passed around among all of the major actors in
34. See CPUC v. Allegheny Energy Supply Co., No. EL02-60-000 (FERC filed Feb.
22, 2002), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/REPORT/13484.htm.
35. See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1778, 1785 (identifying retail rate freeze as source of
IOUs' financial problems).
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the original negotiations including the IOUs themselves, consumer groups,
the CPUC, and the legislature.
It is equally obvious, however, that the state of California could have
avoided the financial meltdown (which eventually forced it to take over the
industry) by permitting retail prices to float with wholesale prices after the
price squeeze on utilities materialized in the summer of 2000, as the utili-
ties requested (by declaring their stranded costs "fully recovered"). Gover-
nor Davis's failure to support such a step in retrospect was undoubtedly a
mistake, as it intensified the meltdown of the newly reformulated power
industry. Admittedly, permitting prices to float was hardly a painless alter-
native-after all, wholesale prices had gone up by a factor of ten by the end
of 2000. What exactly the effect on the economy and politics of California
would have been of permitting such cost increases to pass through to elec-
tricity consumers is hard to say, but it certainly would not have been triv-
ial.36 Nonetheless, the bottom line is that as of late 2000, as a result of the
surge in prices, California was left with two very unpalatable options. It
chose the option which was politically more expedient but probably worse
in the long run. The immediate cause of the meltdown was thus political, a
combination of a failure of will and a great deal of wishful thinking on the
part of the political leadership at the crucial moment when the IOUs might
have been saved. I doubt, however, that there are any deep lessons to be
derived from this experience (other than, perhaps, the inevitability of such
failures of will).
The more interesting question posed by the California crisis was why
exactly wholesale electricity prices rose so sharply in the first place, be-
cause after all, absent the price rises there would have been no price
squeeze, no financial meltdown, and no need for the State to step in. There
are two types of causes that have been identified for the California crisis:
flaws in the institutional structure of the California reforms, and abuse of
market power by electricity generators during the crisis. For practical and
ideological reasons, most political and regulatory actors have chosen to fo-
cus on one or the other explanation (California officials on the latter, fed-
eral officials on the former). In fact, there seems little doubt that both fac-
tors played a role. As noted above, empirical studies suggest that market
manipulation may have contributed significantly to the increase in whole-
sale prices.37 It seems clear, however, that the ability of generators to en-
gage in market manipulation without actual collusion (which would violate
36. One caveat is necessary here-permitting retail price increases would no doubt
have reduced demand, and so perhaps limited some of the wholesale price rises by reducing
the gap between demand and supply. Given the short term inelasticity of demand for elec-
tricity, however, it is difficult to believe that this effect would have been significant.
37. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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the antitrust laws) was itself the result of very tight conditions in electricity
markets.38 Thus, the root cause of the electricity shortages must lie else-
where, in institutional flaws inherent to California's market design.
At some level, the cause of the power shortages that occurred in Califor-
nia from 2000 to 2001 is as simple as the cause of the financial meltdown:
the supply of electricity in California simply did not keep up with de-
mand.39 The reasons for that failure, however, are somewhat more com-
plex, and lie in the nature of electricity and its social and economic role.
As discussed above, the most important trait of electricity is that it cannot
be stored and so must be generated at the same time that it is consumed. In
addition, electricity demand is highly volatile, both in the short run (across
the time of day and time of year) and over longer periods of time. Fur-
thermore, the available supply of electricity is quite inelastic in the short
run because there is a very long lead time required to construct an electric-
ity generation plant and imports of electricity are often unavailable during
the times of greatest need. As a result of these factors, without careful
planning shortages are predictable. But because of its key importance to
both industry and everyday life, electricity shortages (and price hikes) are
also extremely disruptive and unpopular. Thus, electricity is an industry
where planning is essential.
Having identified the importance of planning in the electricity industry,
it seems equally clear that the root cause of California's crisis was clearly a
failure of long term planning, to ensure that supply kept up with demand.
Long term planning is a function that in a traditional, regulated, and verti-
cally integrated system would have been performed in-house by a regulated
utility, with the oversight of regulators.40 The California reforms, however,
relied entirely on decentralized decisionmaking and market-based incen-
tives to ensure that entry into generation occurred in sufficient quantities
(and with sufficient timeliness) to avert shortages. In particular, the utili-
ties were completely removed from any such planning process through a
combination of the requirements that the utilities divest most of their gen-
erating assets (which of course effectively forbade them from building new
38. See Duane, supra note 4, at 531 (noting that when tight market conditions eased in
the summer of 2001, suppliers' ability to manipulate market prices decreased). The condi-
tions themselves cannot be attributed to anticompetitive behavior without falling into circu-
lar thinking.
39. See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1780 (identifying "the now widely known source of
California's power woes" as "demand for power outstripping supply").
40. Admittedly, as noted above, such planning was done with mixed effectiveness in
the two decades prior to California's reforms; however, insofar as planning failures oc-
curred, they tended to result in excess capacity rather than shortages because of risk aversion
on the part of utilities and regulators, a failure which can be economically costly but not
nearly as disruptive as shortages.
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capacity), and that they rely on spot markets for all of their electricity pur-
chases. Having removed the actors traditionally responsible for long term
planning from the equation, California governmental and quasi-
governmental officials (in which I include the ISO and PX staffs) also
failed to engage in such planning in a serious way.4' Finally, the state's
hostility to IOUs entering into long term contracts to hedge their retail ob-
ligations (against exposure to spot market prices) prevented the IOUs from
engaging in long term planning by any method other than construction of
new generation.42 The result was that California's reformed market struc-
ture delegated to no entity the responsibility for long term planning to en-
sure adequate supply.
To understand why the institutional structure adopted by California in
1998 failed so abysmally to engage in effective long term planning, it is
useful to take a step back and think more broadly about institutional struc-
tures and their relationship to regulation and reform. Over the years, the
debate over regulatory reform efforts, in the electricity industry and else-
where, have tended to become rather one-dimensional arguments between
proponents of "efficiency," who tend to favor replacing traditional regula-
tory systems with market structures and proponents of "fairness," who tend
to favor preexisting, top-down regulation. After the New Deal Era, the
regulatory side was dominant for a long period of time because of widely
held perceptions of endemic market failure generally, but especially in so-
called naturally monopolistic industries. As faith in government controls
has ebbed since the 1970s, however, pro-market forces have become domi-
nant, triggering important waves of deregulation and regulatory reforms in
the transportation, the telecommunications, and ultimately the energy sec-
tors.43 But in fact, both sides of this debate are missing important nuances.
Advocates of regulation ignore the fact that insofar as traditional regulation
has produced unnecessarily high energy prices, this harms everyone, both
directly and through the inefficiencies and higher prices imposed through-
out the economy as a whole. Indeed, such higher prices are likely to have a
regressive effect given the proportionately higher share of income spent by
the poor on energy. And if anything was clear by the early 1990s, it is that
41. Joskow notes that the ISO staff did make some efforts beginning in 1999 to con-
tract for peaking capacity to avert shortfalls, but those efforts were ineffective, and in any
event probably could not have prevented the very significant shortages observed in the crisis
period. See Joskow, supra note 2, at 26.
42. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation
of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323 (1998) (summarizing recent trans-
formation of American regulatory law from command-and-control to deregulation and un-
bundling-based systems).
[55:1
2003] LESSONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS 117
traditional regulation was highly inefficient. Thus, traditional regulatory
schemes can hardly be described as advancing "fairness."
If regulatory advocates have tended to ignore the fairness consequences
of regulatory inefficiency, deregulation advocates have demonstrated an
even larger blind spot by ignoring deep ambiguities about the meaning of
the term "markets," and the relationship between "markets" and "effi-
ciency." In understanding this point, the teachings of the school of eco-
nomic analysis which has come to be known as the "New Institutional
Economics," are usefil. The New Institutional Economics (also sometimes
described as Transaction Cost Economics) has its roots in two path-
breaking articles by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase of the University of
Chicago: "The Nature of the Firm" published in 1937,44 and "The Problem
of Social Cost" published in 1960. 45 While very different in emphasis and
scope, both these articles identify and analyze the role of "transaction
costs"-which can be broadly defined as the expenses and barriers associ-
ated with engaging in either market or nonmarket transactions-in influ-
encing the use of price and market mechanisms versus alternative, com-
mand and control structures (such as internal firm management controls, or
governmental intervention) in organizing economic activity.46 In recent
years, the insights which earned Coase his Nobel Prize have been further
developed and given empirical rigor by a group of scholars lead by Oliver
Williamson of the University of California at Berkeley,47 creating what has
become a broad intellectual movement within economics. 48 The key insight
underlying all of the work grouped together in this movement is that in
analyzing the "efficiency" of particular market and nonmarket arrange-
ments, it is essential to focus on the actual institutional structures which
operate in market economies and the transaction costs associated with dif-
ferent institutional structures. More concretely, much of the scholarship in
this area develops and builds on the idea that while spot markets oriented
around immediate, exchange transactions are very good at certain types of
functions-such as using price signals to allocate resources to their most
socially valuable use in the short run-they are not good at other, more
44. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
45. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
46. See RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (The Univ. of Chi-
cago Press 1988) (providing a general compilation and summary of Coase's work).
47. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (The Free Press 1975) (classic work expounding fundamental
principle of the N.I.E.).
48. FIRMS, MARKETS, AND HIERARCHIES: THE TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE (Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece eds., 1999) (summarizing the development
of the New Institutional Economics and introducing new research).
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complex functions. The reason is that the use of discrete, market ex-
changes entails significant transaction costs, including search and informa-
tion costs, exposure to opportunism, difficulties in planning for the future,
and the inability to control risk and thereby maximize investment. That is
why many economic functions are not performed in pure, contemporaneous
exchange (i.e., spot) markets, even in a completely free economy. Instead,
functions which create high transaction costs in a market environment
might be: (1) performed directly by the government, performed by private
firms under governmental supervision; (2) engaged in internally by firms;
or (3) arranged through longer term contractual relationships between
firms.
What does all of this have to do with electricity? In short, transaction
cost economics suggests that there was a reason, not mere anticompetitive
conduct and/or regulatory inertia, why the electricity industry has tradition-
ally been vertically integrated. The kinds of coordination, reliability (in-
cluding assurances of adequate reserve capacity), and long term planning
functions which are essential to a properly functioning electricity system
have not traditionally been amenable to market mechanisms. As a result,
internal firm command-and-control hierarchies evolved to handle them and
because of the naturally monopolistic structure of the resulting firms and
industry (which was itself a product in part of vertical integration), gov-
ernmental regulation followed. The deeper point is that on its face the tra-
ditional structure of the electricity industry seemed inefficient from a static,
price theory perspective because it seemed to ensconce unnecessary, "un-
natural" monopolies in certain sectors of the industry (notably generation).
In fact, the need for vertical integration due to transaction cost barriers to
the use of spot markets or contractual arrangements in coordinating the dif-
ferent parts of the industry might well have meant that the traditional in-
dustry structure was the most efficient one at the time.49
This basic (and hopefully uncontroversial) conclusion has important im-
plications for the events in California. If in fact the traditional structure of
the electricity industry was a product of the need to minimize the transac-
tion costs of coordination and planning, then moving away from such hier-
archical structures was inevitably going to risk introducing inefficiencies
by using markets to perform functions traditionally (and perhaps better)
handled by direct controls. Of course, California's failure to designate in
its reforms any entity responsible for long term planning of electricity sup-
plies was entirely consistent with the State's decision to rely completely on
49. This point is developed in detail in Paul L. Joskow, Introducing Competition Into
Regulated Network Industries: From Hierarchies to Markets in Electricity, in FIRMS,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 237-78 (Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece eds., 1995).
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an atomistic, decentralized spot market mechanism in the electricity gen-
eration sector. It was, however, risky.
It is important not to overstate this point, or to claim certainty in the face
of deep ambiguity. Whatever the most efficient industry structure for elec-
tricity was until the 1960s, there is no doubt that technological innovations
since the 1970s, including the reduction in the efficient size of generation
plants, the increase in transmission efficiency, and most importantly, the
computer revolution, made possible the development of complex coordina-
tion mechanisms among independently owned electricity facilities as well
as the running of efficient real-time spot markets in electricity, and thereby
alleviated many of the coordination problems which earlier required verti-
cal control. However, in retrospect it seems clear that these developments
did not eliminate even those coordination issues; rather, they (arguably)
tipped the balance of efficiency (taking into account transactions costs)
against complete vertical integration.50
Aside from the general, lingering coordination problems that remain in
the electricity industry, the more important conclusion from the above
analysis for our purposes is this: the events in California suggest that even
if short term coordination concerns have been alleviated in recent decades,
technological innovations did not eliminate the long term planning and re-
liability benefits of vertical integration, benefits that California sacrificed
through its decision to move away from a vertically integrated electricity
industry. Again, this point should not be overstated. Vertical integration is
not the only institutional structure through which long term planning can be
accomplished. In particular, it is long been recognized that long-term con-
tracts provide an alternative, sometimes more efficient institutional mecha-
nism for firms to engage in such planning. As noted above, however, the
CPUC prevented the IOUs from entering into such contracts for the acqui-
sition of electricity, 51 thereby disabling the primary market mechanism for
long term planning. Instead, the California system depended entirely on
spot market mechanisms and incentives, on the "Invisible Hand" to per-
form the long term planning function of ensuring that sufficient generation
supplies were availabe to meet demand. Especially in an industry like
electricity generation, where the capital expenditures and the lag-time
needed for entry are very significant and supply is otherwise inelastic, in-
stitutions such as spot markets based on pure exchange mechanisms are not
good at planning to prevent all shortfalls, though they do ultimately re-
spond to shortages by encouraging entry, absent regulatory or economic
50. See id. at 271-76 (providing a similar argument).
51. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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barriers. As a consequence, during the critical period leading up to the
California Electricity Crisis when consumer demand for electricity was
growing rapidly and entry lagging, the decision to rely on spot market
mechanisms to ensure adequate supply turned out to be disastrous, resulting
in a severe shortage. And as discussed above, all of the other elements of
the Crisis were a product of, or exacerbated by, this underlying shortage.
53
In addition to the failure of long term planning for sufficient generation
capacity, another related problem that emerged very early on in the Cali-
fornia system involved the adequacy of reserves. In order for an electricity
system to run reliably, it must have access to reserve capacity to ensure that
demand and supply can be balanced on an ongoing basis in light of unex-
pected outages and other events. California relied on a market to provide
such reserve services (the ISO was responsible for procuring these and
other "ancillary services"). However, it turned out that the market for re-
serves was dysfunctional from the start, producing prices far higher than
expected and forcing the ISO to impose price caps very early.54 Further-
more, these problems should not have been a surprise because providing
reserve capacity, which is not expected to be used and thus is more in the
nature of an option, is a very difficult function to sell in a market given the
well known difficulties in properly pricing options. 55 Additionally, reliance
on short term market exchanges for reserves is problematic since reserves
are most likely to be unavailable when they are most needed (i.e., when
supplies are short), because obviously the market for reserves and for real
52. As Paul Joskow points out, the risks of relying on market forces in electricity gen-
eration (and transmission) did not emerge starkly before the California experiment because
most of the previous wholesale power markets in the United States operated only at the
margins of the existing, vertically integrated structure. See Joskow, supra note 49, at 253-
54.
53. A caveat is necessary. Part of California's problems were undoubtedly a result of
its own flawed implementation rather than a basic drawback of spot markets. By retaining a
fantastically complicated and burdensome regulatory process to build new power plants
(i.e., by limiting supply elasticity), California placed artificial barriers in the path of the
market's capacity to avoid shortages. Furthermore, by insulating most demand from price
signals (through the rate freeze) California exaggerated the consequences of the supply
shortfall by eliminating demand elasticity. In short, the way in which California imple-
mented market reforms substantially interfered with the market signals, which tend to assure
that demand and supply equalize. But it is my view that the problem California faced was
more fundamental than these details of implementation.
54. See Joskow, supra note 2, at 22-24.
55. The standard work on options pricing theory is Fischer Black & Myron Scholes,
The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. PoE. EcoN. 637, 637-54 (1973).
However, the proper pricing of options remains a controversial subject and the Black-
Scholes model is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Coming Clean on Stock Options, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002, at 71.
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power are closely linked. Thus, once again, in the area of reserves the Cali-
fornia system relied on market forces where they are not institutionally well
suited.
Given these serious and probably predictable risks and pitfalls, why did
the CPUC and California legislature adopt a system which relied so heavily
on unsupervised markets? No complete answer is of course possible, but
several reasons do suggest themselves. First and foremost, the designers of
the California system appear to have shared a deep, ideological commit-
ment to "market forces," a commitment which sometimes operated at the
expense of careful consideration of how actual markets perform (which is,
of course, the focus of the New Institutional Economics). 6 In particular,
throughout the years leading up to the Crisis, the CPUC unwaveringly pur-
sued the goal of developing a transparent spot market for electricity in or-
der to create true, marginal-cost-based pricing, and to send clear market
signals to consumers and producers (the classic benefits of an efficient
market). However, in the CPUC's view this goal required it to ban the
IOUs from entering into long term contracts, which might have protected
against supply shortfalls over the medium to long term.57 Second, the
CPUC and legislature clearly shared an unwillingness to accept the full im-
plications of adopting a market design, one of the most important of which
is that all consumers must be exposed to true, market based prices, or else
supply and demand cannot be trusted to clear. This unwillingness was
rooted in an understandable desire to shield smaller customers from highly
volatile prices (hence the rate freeze, which the State refused to lift during
the crisis), but it was completely inconsistent with the desire to adopt spot
markets as the primary institutional structure for running California's elec-
tricity system. Finally, there was a gaping failure on the part of all industry
participants to consider the possibility that the glut of power in the early
1990s could translate into a shortage by the end of the decade. In condi-
tions of oversupply, after all, markets are likely to perform well from the
point of view of consumers because, absent market power, prices will tend
to fall to marginal cost, and long term planning to avoid shortages is un-
necessary. Of course, as events actually took shape, the glut did evolve
into a shortage, and the benefits of a market system rapidly transformed
into weaknesses.
56. Paul Joskow describes the process as dominated by "mindless free-market rheto-
ric." Joskow, supra note 2, at 51-52.
57. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE REFORMS: THE PROMISE OF
LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
What exactly are the implications of all of the above for future reform
efforts in California and elsewhere? Is it that deregulation and the disman-
tling of vertically integrated industry structures are inconsistent with the
need for long term planning and protection of consumers from volatile
prices in the electricity industry? In other words, must we conclude that
the only way to retain and reestablish reliability and consistency is to return
to a world of regulated, vertically integrated, monopolist utilities? In fact,
that does not appear to be the case-which is indeed fortunate because, it
must be remembered, the performance of regulated, integrated monopolies
in recent decades has hardly been ideal.58 However, it does seem clear that
reliance on pure, spot markets as the primary mechanism for distributing
electricity is deeply problematic because such institutions are not well
suited to provide the kinds of long term planning necessary to ensure sta-
bility and reliability. So what is the alternative?
If we desire to retain the benefits of reliability and stability and the effi-
ciencies of markets, the most workable compromise appears to be to return
to (or retain) a system of monopolist utilities who have responsibility to en-
sure a reliable supply of electricity within their service areas, but to require
utilities to rely primarily on long term contracts, rather than on vertically
integrated ownership of generation facilities, for the procurement of elec-
tricity, with shorter term contracts and spot market purchases being used to
balance out short term swings in demand.5 9 In such a system monopoly
ownership and control of local distribution networks is retained, but the
generation sector is not designed to be either monopolistic or integrated
into utilities. And indeed, in such a system divestiture of generation assets
by utilities will probably be required, to ensure that utilities do not self-
prefer in the procurement process. The primary advantage of such an in-
stitutional design is that long term contracts can provide much of the sta-
bility, protect against short term price swings, and long term planning ca-
pacity for future needs which is possible within a fully vertically integrated
system. In particular, because retail prices would be based on an average
of contractual and spot-market acquisition costs, even sharp short-run
swings in spot market prices will not cause significant retail price swings.
At the same time, because the procurement of long term contracts is a
58. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
59. It is almost certainly sound financial planning for a utility to employ a mixture of
long term contracts, shorter term contracts, and spot purchases to produce a balanced elec-
tricity portfolio. See Yuffee, supra note 2, at 86-87. The analysis in the text suggests, how-
ever, that in order to maximize reliability and permit planning, portfolios should be heavily
weighted towards longer term commitments (and guarantees).
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competitive process, such contracts permit competitive pressures to disci-
pline the generation industry, and thereby avoid the enormous inefficien-
cies observed in vertically integrated utilities. In this respect long term
contracts represent an institutional compromise: insofar as they build sta-
ble, long term relationships they resemble vertical integration (and indeed
have been described by some economists as a form of integration); but in-
sofar as they are entered into competitively, they resemble market transac-
tions.6°
The hybrid structure described above appears to provide an excellent
compromise between traditional industry structures and radical decentrali-
zation on the California model. It must be acknowledged, however, that
the very compromise nature of the proposal entails serious costs. In par-
ticular, like full vertical integration, an institutional structure reliant on long
term contracts to procure electricity (and which sets retail prices based on
the average cost of such contracts) fails to provide the kinds ongoing,
transparent price signals based on marginal costs provided by the spot mar-
kets which were at the heart of the California reforms. Of course, acquisi-
tion contracts entered into by IOUs could be structured so that wholesale
prices varied based on cost-of-production at different times of day and
year, and retail rates could be designed to reflect those changing costs; but
such contractual provisions are undoubtedly more complex (and error
prone) than market signals, and the requisite adjustments to retail rate de-
sign have proven very difficult and controversial to implement. As a result,
in a system of long term contracts consumers are likely to end up somewhat
isolated from the actual costs of the service they are provided. This is par-
ticularly problematic in the electricity industry because the marginal cost of
producing electricity varies sharply over the course of the day, the year,
and over longer periods of time, and in a well designed market system
(which California's was not), consumers should be exposed to all those
price signals, permitting them to adjust their consumption patterns in a so-
cially efficient manner. A system based on long term contracts does not
easily lend itself to such efficient pricing.
Another drawback of a system of long term contracts, as opposed to spot
markets in electricity, is that because the responsibility for seeking out and
negotiating such contracts lies with local utilities (with regulatory over-
sight, of course), in such a system entry into the generation market be-
comes completely dependent on decisions by utilities to acquire new power
60. In California, a transition to a regime based on long term contracts entered into by
utilities requires of course that the current contracts entered into by the State be displaced.
If the State is able to avoid or renegotiate these contracts they will not pose a substantial
barrier to further reform. Otherwise, any new regime will have to be phased in over time, as
the state contracts expire.
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rather than on direct market signals. Of course, as noted above, it was the
very failure of market signals to produce timely entry which was at the root
of the California crisis; but insofar as market signals reduce the risk of hu-
man error or political interference, a move away from markets and towards
central planning entails risk.6' Finally, and perhaps most significantly, reli-
ance on long term acquisition contracts effectively means that retail cus-
tomers cannot have any access to competitive electricity markets (i.e., that
utilities must be provided a legal monopoly over electricity distribution, as
was traditionally done). This is because utilities will be entering into long
term commitments to purchase power on behalf of their customers, some-
thing which they can only do if they have a stable demand base. Without
such assured demand, utilities that make firm commitments to purchase
power risk being stuck with unneeded power during periods when spot
prices are below long term contractual prices, and so customers flee to
competitive providers.
CONCLUSION
California's experience during its Electricity Crisis suggests that an
electricity industry organized around long term electricity procurement
contracts may perform in a substantially more efficient manner than either
a traditional, vertically integrated industry or a radically decentralized in-
dustry of the sort created by the California reforms. An institutional model
for the electricity industry based on long term contracts is, however, a
compromise, seeking to gain some of the benefits of market competition
without sacrificing all of the benefits of integration, but as a consequence
losing some of the benefits of each. The deeper lesson here is that in the
spectrum between spot markets at all levels at one end, and regulated, inte-
grated monopolies at the other, there are many intermediate options. These
range from the authorization of wholesale spot markets without any limits
on vertical integration, to a mixture of contracts and self-provision of gen-
erating capacity, to exclusive reliance on long term contractual relation-
ships and/or wholesale spot markets for power acquisition. Each represents
a different set of compromises between the benefits of integration and the
benefits of competition. In California, the authorities responsible for the
State's reform efforts decided to adopt a fully market-based approach, with
essentially no contingency arrangements. And under different circum-
61. The use of long term procurement contracts also does nothing to resolve the prob-
lem of ensuring adequate reserves (one of the earliest failures of the California system),
which presumably should be supplied by utilities internally (or perhaps by the ISO) rather
than through a market structure, given the great difficulty the ISO experienced in running an
efficient market in reserves during the pre-crisis period.
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stances the California system might have worked perfectly, providing pre-
cisely the mixture of efficiency and flexibility that was its objective
(though the risk of collapse would of course always have remained in such
a system). But given the confluence of events that occurred in California
between the springs of 2000 and 2001, California's choice turned out to be
a disaster.
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